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Yet this is not strictly true, and brief summative
examples seem to exist even in their own chapters. As
an applied theorist, for example, I have published a study
of 28 years of US public engagement on LGBT equality
(1987–2015) featuring an exploratory data analysis of
more than 8,000 deliberative expressions across diverse
domains, including sports, religion, and social groups.
Through such summative conversation the US public
reﬂected on and adopted new ways of understanding
marriage, family, gender, and sexuality in a major trans-
formation in cultural scripts and policy that is still ongoing
(Edwina Barvosa, Deliberative Democracy Now: LGBT
Equality and the Emergence of Large-Scale Deliberative
Systems, 2018). The LGBT equality case reveals patterns
in deliberative system growth, key catalysts, the social
infrastructure by which a public builds a system, and
speciﬁc communication practices that help participants
sidestep the hazards of implicit bias and polarizing speech
in easily accessible and often pleasurable ways. If this is so,
a visible summative deliberative system has already
emerged organically in the United States on at least one
topic.
Moreover, this does not seem to be a solitary occur-
rence. Bächtiger and Parkinson make tantalizingly brief
note of the case of public deliberation on Scottish in-
dependence in which the Scottish government “resisted
the urge to design and manage the process itself [resulting
in]. . ..an astonishing outburst of conversation at bus stops
and kitchen tables, in market squares and online forums. . .
.[through which] Scots created a new understanding of
what was distinctively Scottish about their approach to the
state and public policy” (p. 91). As old political practices
break down, democratic publics seem increasingly able
and inclined to create large-scale conversations capable of
decisively shifting social and political practice. Similar
public-led discussions appear to be emerging in the
United States and elsewhere on issues such as rape and
sexual assault, gun violence, racial inequities, economic
inequality, and potentially climate change. This is so even
under polarized conditions, which, in the LGBT case,
frequently sparked reasoned reﬂection across political
divides.
In short, summative deliberation appears to be where
the action is and additive practices may spur this to
greater heights. Only time and more empirical study will
tell. Although worn-out scholarly lenses might lead us
to overlook these developments, this book offers a valu-
able framework from which we can renew informed
scholarly discussion and bring together the wise and
visionary minds of advocates and skeptics alike to
reexamine the shifting prospects for deliberative de-
mocracy. The day may yet come when we are retro-
spectively grateful for the currently painful political
turmoil that brings to the surface not only many
elements in need of public deliberation but also the
dire necessity for democratic publics to ﬁnd their own
way into productive conversation.
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The purpose of this volume is to explore the various ways
that republican political thought can contribute to
debates about the present meaning and future shape of
democracy. It achieves this aim by bringing together
a series of chapters by a range of republican scholars
writing from diverse perspectives, each reﬂecting on the
relationship between republican theory and democracy
from within their particular ﬁeld.
The combined effect is impressive. There are 13 essays
from a stellar cast of contributors that includes a great
many of the ﬁgures that a reader might hope to engage
with, and there is also a helpful introduction from the
two editors. The essays are divided into six short sections
covering the ideal of the common good, historical
responses to the challenges of democratic politics, non-
domination as a democratic ideal, the reciprocal inﬂuen-
ces between republicanism and democracy, the workplace
and the market, and republicanism beyond the nation-
state. There are no weak chapters in the volume, and the
net effect is a thought-provoking collection that chal-
lenges the reader from a wide variety of (often conﬂicting)
standpoints. Although a lot has inevitably been left out of
such a short volume on a rich and fast-changing area, as I
suggest later, its range of subjects and the quality of its
writing mean that this book is likely to become a de-
ﬁnitive collection for the next decade, rather like Cécile
Laborde’s and John Maynor’s Republicanism and Political
Theory (2008) was in the last.
No ﬁrm stance is taken either by the editors or within
the volume on the question of what constitutes repub-
licanism or what its core commitments and principles are.
That is as it should be, because many of the chapters
show the complexity and subtlety of thinking of re-
publican writing even within the conﬁnes of what might
broadly be taken as the Roman, rather than Athenian, or
the Italian-Atlantic tradition that inform most of the
essays. This much said, although a broad range of
historical thinkers are invoked—often innovatively— it
is noticeable that all the contributors conﬁne their
attention to a fairly safe and predictable set of canonized
ﬁgures. Pettit, for example, engages with Rousseau on the
common good; Daniel Kapust closely reads Sallust on
inequality; Annelien de Dijn contrasts the approaches of
Richard Price, John Adams, and James Madison on the
problem of the tyranny of the majority; and Frank Lovett,
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JohnMcCormick, andNadia Urbinati each take in a broad
sweep of established republican authorities in making their
arguments.
There is, however, no mention in the volume of
a single woman writing as a republican before Hannah
Arendt. Neither are any nonwhite historical ﬁgures cited.
This is both a shame and a missed opportunity. There is
now considerable momentum behind the move to
recognize, recover, and restore the contributions to the
history of republican thinking from writers outside of
traditional groups, with this process particularly well
advanced in the case of women. Mary Wollstonecraft,
for example, is now widely accepted as having made
a signiﬁcant contribution to republican thought (Alan
Coffee, “MaryWollstonecraft, Freedom and the Enduring
Power of Social Domination,” European Journal of Political
Theory 12 (2), 2013; Lena Halldenius,Mary Wollstonecraft
and Feminist Republicanism, 2015). She is, however, but
one of many, with the revolutionary period at the end of
the eighteenth century alone providing many others, such
as Catharine Macaulay, Anna Laetitia Barbauld, Olympe
de Gouges, and Sophie de Grouchy. Each wrote in-
novatively and inﬂuentially on themes of voice, inclusion,
representation, and equality that lie squarely within the
concerns of this volume. Similarly, African American
writers in the nineteenth century frequently drew on the
republican themes of the American, French and Haitian
Revolutions; they include Frederick Douglass, Harriet
Jacobs, Anna Julia Cooper, and James McCune Smith,
among many others.
Almost every chapter in the book engages with Philip
Pettit’s work at some point, even if critically. Again, this is
to be expected, because Pettit’s scholarship represents by
far the most extensively worked-out account of neo-
republicanism and has overwhelmingly set the agenda
for contemporary debate within the ﬁeld. Nevertheless,
the lack of theoretical diversity in the volume shows in the
way that contributors respond to Pettit. A great many
theoretical problems in republicanism ultimately come
back to its central tension, based on its being an account of
the self-governing individual in a self-governing commu-
nity. At some point, all republicans must identify a crite-
rion by which they can establish the acceptable limits of
coercive force that is consistent with individual freedom.
The criterion must be sufﬁciently narrow to leave indi-
viduals free to pursue their own ends while being sub-
stantial enough to serve as the basis for real-life laws that
are both stable and acceptable to the population. This
represents the distinction between arbitrary (illegitimate,
dominating) and nonarbitrary (legitimate, nondominat-
ing) power.
Broadly speaking, identifying this criterion can be
approached in two ways. The most common approach
by far in the literature is to accept that a process of public
reason based on shared standards and values can in
principle establish and administer a set of nonarbitrary
laws. The task, then, is to determine how we should give
speciﬁc content to the criterion of nonarbitrariness and
whom we should trust to administer this process. Should
we, for example, follow the popular will or turn to a set of
appointed guardians of the constitution? Do we have
most to fear from the tyranny of the majority or from an
unaccountable minority? These questions are taken up by
de Dijn, McCormick, and Urbinati, with the latter two
entering into a spirited and useful exchange on represen-
tative democracy. A concern of McCormick’s is the
unconstrained power of wealth, a theme that ties in with
Kapust’s contribution. (For their part, Lovett and Niko
Kolodny engage at a more abstract level with the question,
asking what is the relationship between republicanism and
democracy and what is the essential harm of being under
the rule of others, respectively.)
Republicans may, however, question the operation of
public reason itself. To do so represents a second level of
republican inquiry into the criterion of arbitrariness. This
is a necessary approach to take where the social and
cultural preconditions for a free republic and a democratic
system have not been met and must ﬁrst be addressed. A
key concern of Wollstonecraft’s in this context, for
example, is that if women’s perspectives are not reﬂected
in the baseline of cultural attitudes, values, beliefs, and
practices that inform public debate, then women can
have no chance of making a rational case for their rights to
equal citizenship, something that is required for both
republican freedom and democracy. This is not a pe-
ripheral matter for republicans but something both
theoretically and practically essential to their frame-
work. However, only one chapter in the book directly
addresses this issue, with the rest of the ﬁrst eight
chapters focused on the operation of institutions that
are successfully governed by public reason (following
Pettit’s lead on this). Lida Maxwell navigates this second
level of inquiry by making the unrepublican case for
codependence as a sometimes necessary and valuable
condition for marginalized people to contest prevailing
social norms, but without engaging with the ample avail-
able resources written by women and minority group
members from within the republican tradition. The
chapter is excellent and provocative, nevertheless, and so
my comment is not aimed at Maxwell so much as at the
overall balance of the volume.
The ﬁnal two sections of the volume look beyond the
traditional scope of democratic theory, examining ﬁrst the
world of the workplace and second the transnational and
global context. In the section on work, the contributors
apply republican principles to the workplace, a matter
that has until very recently been largely overlooked in the
contemporary literature, even if there are notable historic
antecedents. Oppressive work environments, even those
that appear to be contractual and voluntary, are a pressing
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social concern that test the republican reliance on the
notion of nondomination. Alex Gourevitch defends an
unconditional right of all workers to strike, Elizabeth
Anderson looks for ways to restructure the workplace to
disperse power in accountable ways, and Robert Taylor
favors a market-driven approach based on exit possibil-
ities. This is an area of increasing republican focus, and
these essays serve as an excellent gateway into that
literature. Finally, beyond the nation-state, Richard
Bellamy uses the European Union as a case study to
argue for an association of republican states built around
their own demos, whereas Stuart White examines the
power of networked activism found in movements like
Occupy Wall Street to combat oligarchy and reshape
domestic politics in similar and linked ways across
national boundaries. These ﬁnal sections nicely round
off a volume that contains both history and abstract
theory in practical and transformative ways that are
forward looking and liable to appeal to even nonrepu-
blican readers.
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Are Markets Moral? invites comparison to other recent
books that explore the moral implications of markets (for
example, Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The
Moral Limits of Markets, 2013; and Debra Satz,Why Some
Things Should Not Be for Sale: The Moral Limits of Markets,
2010). Somewhat surprisingly, however, the essays here
(save for John Tomasi’s “Economic Liberties and Human
Rights” and Steven Lukes’ “‘Getting and Spending, We
Lay Waste Our Powers’: On the Expanding Reach of the
Market” ) do not directly engage Sandel’s or Satz’s worries
about commodiﬁcation, the creep of market logic, and the
persistent challenges of inequality and corruption that
threaten market relations. The title Are Markets Moral? is
thus misleading. Instead, Arthur Melzer and Steven
Kautz’s volume takes up a much broader set of questions:
Is capitalism, and its institutions and relations, good for us?
Which features of capitalism are the most supportive of
human freedom and development, and which are the most
challenging to them? Is capitalism morally attractive
compared to the alternatives? If so, what kind of capitalism
do we want to endorse, and how should it be situated
among other goods that we value? These questions
certainly invite careful attention to markets as a key feature
of capitalist political economies. But they are capacious
enough to draw our attention to other facets of them:
contracts, private property, entrepreneurship, labor rela-
tions, production, money, investment, and savings. At the
expense of a more focused conversation about the morality
of markets, marketization, and commodiﬁcation, Are
Markets Moral? instead asks us to think more widely about
whether capitalism—of which markets are just one aspect
—is compatible with human ﬂourishing. Most of the
book’s essays come down in favor of capitalism, either on
its own terms or in comparison to other forms of political
economy, but as Arthur Melzer helpfully details in his
introductory essay, the sense that it is “morally disruptive”
persists and serves as an important framework for all of
these pieces (p. 9).
This book’s major appeal is that it generates lively
conversation among its contributors about whether and
how capitalism disrupts moral life. Some of these
exchanges are explicit and direct, such as Lukes’ engage-
ment with John Tomasi’s Free Market Fairness (2012), an
argument for free-market democracy that Tomasi extends
in his essay for Are Markets Moral? Lukes and Tomasi have
a vigorous disagreement about whether the “private
economic liberties of market society”—articulated as the
personal rights of individuals to decide how to work, own,
spend, invest, and save—should be prioritized in demo-
cratic society. Tomasi argues for the intrinsic personal
moral value of these rights and the inherent value of the
“familiar work-a-day virtues associated with economic
liberties” by ordinary people (p. 25). Tomasi’s point is
that economic decision making is simultaneously un-
remarkable and urgent: everyone makes decisions about
how to work, spend, and save, but “such decisions
constitute among the most distinctive forms of taking
responsibility for one’s own life, and doing so in light of
one’s own dreams, values, and character” (p. 26). For their
role in individual self-authorship, economic liberties have
inherent value and must be safeguarded. Lukes, in
contrast, questions whether the behaviors Tomasi high-
lights are “manifestations of freedom or of a growing
subjection” to the totalizing processes of marketization and
commodiﬁcation (p. 71). While taking Tomasi’s argu-
ments for economic liberty seriously, Lukes questions
what he takes to be their grounding assumptions: (1) that
individuals can be “independent “self-author[s]” un-
touched by “background. . .institutions, laws, and norms,”
as well as “luck”; and (2) that “market freedom renders
market actors free from coercion and domination,” even as
many of them experience forms of poverty, economic loss,
and under- or unemployment (pp. 80–81). Per the ﬁrst
point, Lukes also suggests that markets mold economic
actors’ desires and capabilities, which might also unsettle
the picture of them as wholly self-directed beings (p. 81).
In brieﬂy interrogating these assumptions, Lukes chal-
lenges Tomasi’s argument for economic—or market—
freedom as a human right. The stakes of the debate
between Tomasi and Lukes are high: their exchange
presses readers to consider the scope and value of economic
freedom in comparison to other kinds of freedom and
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